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The Impact of Federal Labor Policy on the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:
Collective Bargaining Agreements in a
New Era of Civil Rights

Nearly thirty years have passed since Dr. Martin Luther
King dreamed of an America where people would "not be
judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their
character."' When Dr. King delivered these famous words,
Congress had already taken a major step toward making this
dream a reality when it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which bars discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' However, because neither Title VII nor subsequent federal civil rights legislation addressed private sector discrimination against the disabled:
Americans with disabilities continued to endure unconscionable
The passage of the Americans
employment dis~rimination.~

1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ennobles the Civil Rights Movement at the Lincoln
Memorial, in LEND M E YOUR EARS: GREATSPEECHESIN HISTORY499 (William
Safue comp., 1992).
2.
42 U.S.C. 82000e-2 (1988).
Prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Congress passed two
3.
important laws designed to foster the rights of the disabled, but neither law addressed private sector employment discrimination. The first of these laws, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was aimed at discrimination against the disabled within
programs funded by the federal government. It provides that "[lo . . . handicapped
individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29
U.S.C. 8 794 (1988). Second, the Education of the Handicapped Act, extensively
amended by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
$$ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991), was enacted to ensure that "all handicapped
children have available to them . . . a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique
needs." 20 U.S.C. 8 1400(c) (Supp. 111 1991).
4.
Speaking of the effect that exclusionary attitudes have on disabled Americans, one writer noted:
"At the least you might conclude that there is something queer about
you, something ugly or foolish or shameful. In the extreme, you might
feel as though you don't exist, in any meaningfkl social sense at all. Everyone else is 'there,' sucking breath mints and splashing on cologne and
swigging wine coolers. You're 'not there.' And if not there, nowhere."
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with Disabilities Act (ADA or "the Act")5 in 1990 signaled the
recognition of such discrimination and the beginning of a new
era of employment equality for the disabled. Borrowing from
Dr. King's language, one individual stated that the "'ADA's
vision is of an America where persons are judged by their abilities and not on the basis of their disabilities.' "6
Even though the ADA is designed to foster equal employment opportunity for the disabled, it appears to conflict with
other federal legislation designed to strengthen the position of
employees v i s - h i s their employers through the process of collective bargaining. This comment examines these conflicts and
proposes that, in spite of apparent inconsistencies between
federal labor laws and the ADA, neither supersedes the other
and both are necessary to promote and protect the civil rights

Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimimtion Under Title I of The Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1607,
1611-12 (1991) (quoting Nancy Mairs, Hers, N.Y. TIMES,July 9, 1987, a t C2).
Murphy notes that, if disabled Americans are "not there" in social circles, they
are even less "there" in the workforce; statistical evidence indicates that employment opportunities for the disabled are rapidly diminishing. Id. a t 1612. For example, a recent Census Bureau report found that people with disabilities are less
likely to hold jobs now than they were a decade earlier, and those who do work
have actually lost earning power. Id. (citing Study on Disabled and Jobs Finds
Aug. 16, 1989, a t A.22). In addition,
Work and Good Pay Are Scarce, N.Y. TIMES,
the percentage of disabled men who work full time dropped from 29.8% in 1981 to
23.4% in 1988. Id.
Yet even the force of these statistics pales in comparison to the personal life
stories of disabled Americans who have suffered employment discrimination. At one
of the congressional hearings on the ADA, a blind attorney who had graduated Phi
Beta Kappa from the University of Pennsylvania and attended Harvard Law School
testified that while applying for a job as corporate counsel, he was rejected over
600 times before a corporation offered him employment. Id. (citing Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1989) (statement of Joseph
Danowsky, Attorney, Bear Stearns & Company)).
Another attorney, confined to a wheelchair because of multiple sclerosis, experienced similar difficulties. Despite having graduated near the top of her law school
class at the University of Washington, and despite her law review experience, moot
court success, and clerkships with a federal appellate court and a renowned intellectual property firm, she was rejected over 400 times before she was hired by a
firm that "was willing to look a t [her] qualifications and not just [her] disability."
Id. (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the House Subcomm. on Civil and Constztutional Rights, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1989) (statement of Laura D. Cooper,
Attorney, Pettit & Martin)).
5.
42 U.S.C. $9 12101-12213 (Supp. I1 1990).
6.
Murphy, supra note 4, at 1613 (citing H.R. REP. No. 485(II), lOlst Cong.,
2d Sess. 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 330 (statement of Sandy
Parrino).
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of the disabled. Part I1 provides an overview of Title I of the
ADA, focusing on the duty it imposes on employers to make
"reasonable accommodations" for disabled employees. Part I11
discusses the potential conflicts between the ADA and the National Labor Relations Act.' Part IV undertakes a similar analysis of the relationship between the ADA and the Railway Labor Act.' Finally, Part V reviews the specific issue of reassignment and shows how the federal labor policy promoting collective bargaining interacts with ADA requirements.
This comment concludes by suggesting that both federal
labor laws and the ADA have positive roles to play in eliminating employment discrimination against the disabled. The ADA,
by recognizing the validity of collective bargaining agreements
and their importance in resolving employment disputes, encourages the continued use of the collective bargaining process
and arbitration to protect disabled employees from discrimination. Federal labor laws do not contradict the ADA because,
while they certainly are capable of addressing the grievances of
individual employees, the laws are primarily concerned with
protecting the right of employees to speak collectively. The
ADA, on the other hand, is civil rights legislation specifically
designed to provide individual remedies for employees. While a
disabled employee may be able to obtain redress through appropriate arbitration proceedings, he must be able to obtain
relief in federal court under the ADA when his rights are not
protected under the collective bargaining agreement.
WITH DISABILITIES
ACT
11. TITLE1 OF THE AMERICANS

A comprehensive and sweeping statute, the ADA is composed of several different sections, each of which was enacted
to eradicate a particular form of discrimination against the
d i ~ a b l e dAll
. ~ of the sections are significant, but the core of the
Act is Title I, which prohibits all forms of employment discrimination. lo Pervasive discriminatory practices against disabled
employees and job applicants are well documented;" the pur7.
29 U.S.C. $$ 151-169 (1988).
8.
45 U.S.C. $5 151-188 (1988).
9.
Title I, 42 U.S.C. $5 12111-12117 (Supp. I1 1990), prohibits employment
discrimination; Title 11, $8 12131-12165, requires greater accessibility to public
transportation; and Title 111, $5 12181-12189, bans discrimination by private entities in places of public accommodation.
lo.
42 U.S.C. $8 12111-12117 (supp. n 1990).
11.
See supra note 4; see also Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The.Duty to Accommodate:
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pose of Title I is to ensure the elimination of such practices by
imposing affirmative duties on employers.12 The ADA requires
every employer covered under the Act13 to engage in a threestep inquiry regarding its treatment of a disabled individual.
Each employer must determine (1) whether the applicant or
employee is a qualified individual with a disability,14 (2)
whether the applicant or employee is capable of performing the
job's essential functions,15 and (3) whether the employer is
required to make a reasonable accommodation.16

A. Is the Applicant or Employee a Qualified
Individual with a Disability?
When making any type of employment decision, the employer must first determine if the particular applicant or employee is a qualified individual with a disability.'' According
to the Act's definitions, "[tlhe term 'qualified individual with a
disability' means a n individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires."lg A disabled individual meets one part of the
Will Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with
Disabilities Only to Disable Small Businesses?, 66 NOTRE
DAMEL. REV. 1135, 1136
(1991).
12.
Lavelle, supra note 11, a t 1193.
13.
As defined by the Act, the term "employer" means
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more
employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person,
except that, for two years following the effective date of this subchapter,
an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of
such person.
42 U.S.C. $ 12111(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1990). Excluded from the definition of "employer*
are the United States, corporations wholly owned by the United States government,
Indian tribes, and bona fide private membership clubs (other than labor organizations) that are exempt from taxation. Id. $ 12111(5)(B).
14.
See 42 U.S.C. $$ 12111(8), 12112(a) (Supp. 11 1990); 29 C:F.R. $ 1630.2(m)
(1992).
15.
See 42 U.S.C. 8 12111(8) (Supp. I1 1990); 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(m)-(n) (1992).
16.
42 U.S.C. $ 12111(9) (Supp. 11 1990); 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(0) (1992).
17.
"Disability," with respect to an individual, is defined under the Ad's regulations as "(1) [a] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) [a]record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment." 29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(g)
(1992).
18.
42 U.S.C. $ 12111(8) (Supp. 11 1990).
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"qualified" requirement if he "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the
employment position [he] holds or desire^."'^ Yet in order to
fully "qualify," a disabled person must also be capable of performing the "essential functions" of the position, with or without reasonable accornm~dation.~~

B. Is the Applicant or Employee Capable of
Performing the Job's Essential Functions?
Employers only have duties to accommodate disabled persons who can perform a job's "essential functions," defined i n
the Act's regulations as "[tlhe fundamental job duties of the
employment position the individual with a disability holds or
desires."" This prerequisite is a key provision of the Act, because it is here that one sees for the first time interaction between federal labor policy and the ADA.
The Act itself does not clearly define what determines
whether a certain job function is "essential"; it states only t h a t
[flor the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job
are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job.22

The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), however, make it clear that evidence of whether a particular job function is essential may
include much more than simply the employer's judgment. The
evidence may include, among other things, "[tlhe terms of a
collective bargaining agreement."23 By including collective bargaining agreements as evidence to be considered, the ADA's
provisions concerning essential job functions will be construed
not only with the employer's, but also with the employees',
judgment in mind.24
19.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
Id. The regulations also offer guidance on interpreting "reasonable accommo20.
dation," noting that "[a111employer or other covered entity is not required to reallocate essential functions." Id. app. $ 1630.2(0).
Id. § 1630.2(n).
21.
22.
42 U.S.C. g 1 m i ( 8 ) (supp. n 1990).
23.
29 C.F.R. 5 1630.2(n)(3)(v) (1992).
24.
See infia notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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C. Is the Employer Required to Make a

Reasonable Accommodation?
Upon making a determination that a n applicant or employee is a qua15ed employee with a disability who can perform
the job's essential functions, a n employer is generally required
under the Act to make "reasonable accommodations" for the
disabled person's known d i ~ a b i l i t i e s As
. ~ ~defined by the ADA,
the term "reasonable accommodation" may include
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with d i ~ a b i l i t i e s . ~ ~

However, there are exceptions to this general requirement. An
employer does not have to make a reasonable accommodation
for a disabled applicant or employee if the employer can prove
that doing so would cause "undue hard~hip,'"~
defined by the
Act as any "action requiring significant difficulty or expense?' Again, the Act itself provides only minimal guidance
as to what factors should be considered in determining whether
a particular accommodation would impose a n undue hardship
on a n employer. The four factors it lists focus mainly on the
relationship between the cost of the proposed accommodation
and the financial resources of the employer.2g
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

42 U.S.C. § 12112@)(5)(A) (Supp.

II 1990).

Id. § 12111(9).
Id. 8 12112@)(5)(A).
Id. § 12111(10).
The Act states that factors to be considered include
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity;
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On the other hand, EEOC regulations are more illustrative
and, as with determinations of "essential functions," are deferential to established federal labor policy. Noting that a demonstration of undue hardship under the ADA requires a stronger
showing of difficulty or expense than that required to satisfy
the "de minimis" Title VII standard of undue hardship, the
interpretive guidance appendix to the regulations stipulates
that cost alone may not be deter~ninative.~'
However, the regulations significantly expand the factors
upon which an employer might rely to cogently defend its decision not to make a reasonable accommodation; these factors
include the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.31
The interpretive guidelines to the regulations state:
Excessive cost is only one of several possible bases upon
which an employer could demonstrate undue hardship. Alternatively, for example, an employer could demonstrate that the
provision of a particular accommodation would be unduly
disruptive to its other employees or to the functioning of its
business. The terms of a collective bargaining agreement may
be relevant to this deter~nination.~~

This express recognition of the status of collective bargaining agreements suggests that the ADA is meant to dovetail
with, rather than undercut, several established federal labor
acts designed to strengthen the collective rights of all employees, not only those who are disabled. The following sections address notions of preemption and discuss how federal labor policy and the ADA mutually support the right of all disabled persons to be free from employment discrimination.
CONFLICTS
BETWEENTHE ADA AND
111. POTENTIAL
THE NATIONAL
~ B O RELATIONS
R
ACT
The preeminent federal law governing relationships between employers and employees is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).33 Enacted in 1935, one of the NLRA's pur-

the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the
facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.

Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.

29 C.F.R. app. $ 1630.15(d) (1992).
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C.$9 151-169 (1988).
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poses is to "remov[e] certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working condition^."^^ By
promoting the two important practices of collective bargaini n g 5 and arbitration,s6 the NLRA intends to protect "the exercise by workers. of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or prote~tion."~'The NLRA
and the federal labor policy it embodies must be considered
when interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act.

A. NLRA Collective Bargaining and the ADA
Concern has been expressed that the ADA may undermine
collective bargaining procedures established by the NLRAS8
Yet the ADA, while it appears to pose several potential conflicts with the NLRA, actually works in tandem with the
NLRA's collective bargaining procedures.
1. The right to exclusive representation

One of the apparent conflicts between the ADA and the

NLRA involves the right of unions to be the exclusive representative of bargaining unit employees.3g Section 9 of the NLRA
states:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to

34.
Id. $ 151.
See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
35.
36.
See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
37.
29 U.S.C. $ 151 (1988).
38.
Jules L. Smith, Americans with Disabilities Act: The New Regulations and
l
of the American Bar AssociCritical Issues 35 (paper presented at a ~ u a meeting
ation Section of Labor & Employment Law, Atlanta, Georgia (Aug. 12-13, 1991))
(unpublished manuscript, available from Jules L. Smith, Blitman & King, Rochester, New York).
Id. at 36-40.
39.
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their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, a s long a s
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given
opportunity to be present a t such adjustment."

As one commentator pointed out, this provision appears to be
directly contrary to the ADA regulations promulgated by the
EEOC, which allow for one-on-one discussions between the
disabled person and the employer.41These regulations state:
To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation i t
may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation. This process should
identify the precise limitations resulting fiom the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome
those limitation^.^^

Attempting t o comply with both section 9 of the NLRA and
the ADA regulations may place both unions and employers in a
quandary.43 If an employer conducts a n "informal, interactive
process" with a disabled individual to determine a suitable
reasonable accommodation, the employer disregards its duty
under the NLRA to bargain exclusively with the union representatives of its employees." The employer might try to resolve this conflict by inviting the union representative to be
present a t the "informal'' discussion it conducts with the disabled person pursuant to the ADA. However, the presence of
the union representative may in turn violate confidentiality
provisions of the ADA.45 Nonetheless, these apparent conflicts
do not undermine either the purposes or the effective enforcement of the two acts.
a . Exclusivity and the principle of majority rule. I t can
certainly be argued that the primary purpose of the NLRA is to
strengthen the institutional foundation of unions. Under this
view, the NLRA favors unions in order to remedy the inequali-

43.

29 U.S.C. $ 159(a) (1988).
Smith, supra note 38, at 40.
29 C.F.R. $ 1630.2(0)(3) (1992).
Smith, supra note 38, at 39.

44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 40.

40.
41.
42.

1064 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992
-

ty of bargaining power between employees and employer^.^"
As one commentator noted, the NLRA "not only protects the
voluntary associations of workers but serves to empower
them."47
A contrary view is that the NLRA was not designed to
favor one side over another but "to foster in a neutral manner"
a system that would resolve the conflicting interests of management and labor.48 In other words, while unionization under
the NLRA appears designed to protect workers from the arbitrary and demeaning actions of employers, it is not clear
whether the benefits of collective organization were designed to
Thus, it is reasonable to suggest
be mandatory or v~luntary.'~
that the NLRA is concerned a t least as much with the interests
of individual employees as it is with the institutional power of
unions.50

I

'

46.
See 29 U.S.C. 8 151 (1988) (recognizing "the inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess hll freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract, and employers"); see also Alkire v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th
Cir. 1983) ("A principal purpose of the labor laws is to 'redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and management . . . .' " (citation omitted)); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The Wagner
Act was of course intended to promote unionization."); Fafnir Bearing Co. v. NLRB,
362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) ("The National Labor Relations Act . . . was
designed to overcome the inequality of bargaining power between employees and
employers.").
One commentator explained that the employer's duty to bargain under NLRA
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988), coupled with the rule forbidding employers from
unilaterally instituting changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining without first
bargaining with the union, see NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409
(1964), 5 s a significant expression of a n obligation to regard the union as having
some unspecified authority in the premises and thus amounts to a partial transfer
to the union of what was once an unrestricted authority." Charles Fried, Individual
and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor
Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1026 (1984).
47.
Fried, supm note 46, a t 1023.
48.
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1981).
49.
Fried, supm note 46, a t 1027. See also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct.
841, 845 (1992) ("By its plain terms, . . . the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers."); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 592 F.2d 595, 602 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[Tlhe [NLRA] was not passed to encourage pro-union activity . . . .3.
50.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d
1162, 1163 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The Act's provisions were designed to permit workers
to exercise freely the right to join unions, to be active or passive members, or to
abstain from joining any union at all without imperiling their right to a livelihood."); NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prod., 403 F.2d 702, 704 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The
Act 'was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished from the
primary benefit to labor unions . . . . ' " (citation omitted)).
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Indeed, the NLRA protects not only the employees' right t o
freely associate for purposes of self-organization, but also their
right to disas~ociate.~'
In addition to having the right to refrain from participation in labor organizations and concerted
activity,52many employees also have the right to refuse union
membership under state right-to-work laws permitted by the
NLRA.53
Consequently, many employees do not desire, nor are they
required, to be exclusively represented by a labor organization
in their dealings with management.54Considering the unique

51.

Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. $ 157 (1988) (emphasis added).
Id.
52.
"Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
53.
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law." 29 U.S.C. $ 164 (1988).
Today, 21 states have right-to-work laws that are permissible under the section
cited above. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., CASESAND MATERIALS ON LABORLAW 1117
(11th ed. 1991). These laws basically provide that employees are not required to
join a union as a condition of receiving or retaining a job. Id. Labor organizations
have campaigned heavily to overturn the laws, primarily on the grounds that since
unions must represent both members and non-members, those who do not join are
"free riders," receiving benefits without cost. Id. at 1119.
On the other hand, employers are strongly in favor of right-to-work laws; they
emphasize " 'the basic rights of a n individual to get and keep a job without having
to pay tribute to any organization in order to make a living.' " Id. a t 1120 (citation
omitted). Moreover, employers stress that many employees desire to refrain from
joining a union or paying dues for valid reasons of conscience. Id.
54.
Once a union has been certified or has established a majority status, the
exclusive representation rule becomes operational and a worker has no choice but
to be represented by the union. Fried, supra note 46, a t 1028 (citing J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39 (1944)). While the employee may not be forced to
join the union (even though he may be required to pay union dues), he will still
be bound by the result of union bargaining. Id. However, even in this situation it
is conceivable that a disabled employee could meet privately with the employer
without a union steward present. Section 9 of the NLRA requires the union to be
the exclusive representative of the employees only "for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. $ 159(a) (1988). Therefore, as long as the private
employer/employee conference over reasonable accommodation does not patently
involve "terms and conditions" of employment, such as an employee's request for a
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and difficult problems disabled persons face, disabled employees in a unionized setting will often be justified in pursuing the
direct contact with their employers that is encouraged under
the ADA.
Moreover, it should be noted that union personnel designated under section 9 of the NLRA to be the employees' representatives may not be the actual representative choice of all, or
even a majority of, the bargaining unit employees.55 In the
event a union fails to fairly represent an employee, it commits
a n unfair labor practice and faces possible sanctions.56 Such
sanctions, however, do not effectively protect the individual
rights to which a disabled employee is entitled under the ADA.
Since disabled employees might not be fairly represented by a
union,5' the ADA is necessary to provide an appropriate method of redress for all disabled individuals who suffer the consequences of arbitrary management decisions.58
b. Confidentiality requirements of the ADA. A related
potential conflict between the NLFU and the ADA concerns
issues of privacy. It is well established under the NLRA that
a n employer need not disclose any or all information that a
union asserts is necessary to process a grievance; the privacy
rights of employees may override union interests in arguably
obtaining relevant i n f o r m a t i ~ nThe
. ~ ~ issue under the ADA is
wheelchair ramp to enter and exit the building or a wheelchair-accessible bathroom
stall, it would not violate the exclusive representation principle of the NLRA. On
the other hand, if the private conference involves negotiating a reasonable accommodation that will clearly affect the "terms and conditions" of employment for all
union employees in the workplace, see discussion infra part V, then a union representative would clearly have to be present.
As a general rule, a union may be certified in an election if it gets a ma55.
jority of the votes cast. Thus, since a union may be designated by a majority of
valid ballots, the union might in fact only represent a minority of the employees if
only a small proportion of eligible voters participate. COX ET AL., supm note 53, a t
116.
56.
Sections 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA impose a "duty of fair representation" on the union. 29 U.S.C. $ 158(b)(2)-(3) (1988). If a union violates its duty of
fair representation by discriminating on the basis of race or sex, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) may revoke the union's certification. COX ET AL., supra
note 53, a t 1044.
57.
See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
58.
50, 70 (1975) (When union and employer are not responsive to their legal obligations, the bargain they have struck must yield pro tanto to the law, whether by
means of conciliation through the offices of the EEOC, or by means of federal-court
enforcement a t the instance of either that agency or the party claiming to be aggrieved.").
59.
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318-19 (1979) (holding that an
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whether the sensitive medical and health histories of employees will be accessible t o unions. The ADA's "confidentiality"
provision states:
A covered entity may require a medical examination after an
offer of employment has been made to a job applicant and
prior to the commencement of the employment duties of such
applicant, and may condition an offer of employment on the
results of such examination, if(A) all entering employees are subjected to such an examination regardless of disability;
(B) information obtained regarding the medical condition
or history of the applicant is collected and maintained on
separate forms and in separate medical files and is
treated a s a confidential medical record, except that(i) supervisors and managers may be informed
regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations . . . .60

Union representatives can participate in "reasonable accommodation conferences" without violating this provision for
two reasons. First, it should be emphasized that this provision
applies only to the results of employee medical examinations.
Many disabled individuals may be entitled to reasonable accommodation and an employer conference regarding such accommodation even though their disability does not involve a
medical ~ondition.~'
Second, an analysis of NLRA definitions leads one to the
conclusion that unions should have access to examination records. The ADA provides that, although medical information is
to be confidential, supervisorss2 and managers are entitled to
employer was not required to disclose the results of employee aptitude test scores
to the union without employee consent because the testing information was of a
"sensitive nature" and the "burden on the Union . . . [was] minimal").
60.
42 U.S.C. 4 12112(3) (Supp. I1 1990).
61.
For example, learning disabilities and other psychological disorders are
included in the definition of "disability." 29 C.F.R. 8 1630.2(g) (1992). While most
laypersons view the ADA as providing " 'wheelchair ramps and braille stickers on
elevators, . . . statistically the largest number of people the ADA will affect will be
the learning disabled.' " Elaine Jarvik, Learning Disorders Make Life Puzzling and
Heartbreaking, DESERETNEWS,Nov. 6, 1992, at C1 (quoting Michael Herbert, director of the Research Assessment Center, University of Utah).
62.
According to the NLRA, the term "supervisor" means
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or
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be informed about an employee's medical status." Since supervisors are representatives of upper management, it follows
that supervisors will frequently exercise "independent judgment" and participate directly in ADA "conferences" with disabled individuals to determine what reasonable accommodation
needs to be made. Thus, it would be inconsistent for the ADA
to grant supervisors access to a disabled person's medical records but exclude union representatives from "reasonable accommodation" conferences with supervisors during which such
records frequently will be discussed. In addition, it must be
noted that supervisors and managers are the ones to whom
unionized employees usually bring their grievance^.^^ Unions
may be entitled to employee medical records in order to properly process a grievance with or against the ~ u p e r v i s o r . ~ ~
2. Mandatory subjects of bargaining
In addition to dovetailing with the NLRA on the issue of
discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in c o ~ e d i o n
with the foregoing the exercise of authority is not of a merely routine or
clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
29 U.S.C. 9 152(11) (1988) (emphasis added).
63.
42 U.S.C. 3 12112(3)(B)(i) (Supp. I1 1990).
See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargainiqj Agree64.
ment, 61 CAL.L. REV. 663, 743 (1973) ("The grievance procedure normally consists
of steps. First, the aggrieved employee, or the union, raises the problem with the
immediate supervisor.").
65.
I t may be difficult for unions to gain access to individual medical examination records of employees on the grounds that the NLRB has recognized that
"employers may have a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting the confidentiality of employees' medical records." Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local
Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing JohnsManville Sales Corp., 252 N.L.R.B. 368, 368 (1980)). However, since Detroit Edison,
440 U.S. a t 318-19, requires the NLRB and courts to weigh the union's interest in
relevant information against an employer's legitimate interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of such information, it is conceivable that employers will a t times be
required to divulge medical information otherwise confidential under the ADA. This
is particularly true in the case of reassignment, where the union's attempts to
enforce seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement may be frustrated
if an employer suddenly transfers a newly hired disabled employee to "light duty
work." See discussion supra part V. Without an opportunity to examine and challenge the medical condition of the employee (to verify a t a minimum whether he
has met the physical criteria for such a transfer), unions may find their efforts to
uphold collective bargaining agreement provisions governing "light duty" reassignment to be undermined. In short, the union's interest in preserving intact seniority
provisions and other "terms and conditions" of employment present in the collective
bargaining agreement may be weighed more heavily than an employer's interest in
preserving confidentiality under the ADA.
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exclusive representation, the ADA also reinforces the process of
collective bargaining itself. A key provision of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet a t reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
empl~yment."~"f one views the NLRA's purpose as one of furthering collective employee participation, it is natural to interpret the NLRA's "terms and conditions of employment" language broadly. Thus, virtually every matter which has an impact on the terms and conditions of employment becomes a
matter over which the employer must bargain c~llectively.~~
The ADA encourages collective bargaining by prohibiting
discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability-a disabled person capable of performing a job's essential
functions. Since "essential functions" are defined by EEOC
regulations as "the fundamental job duties of the employment
position the individual with a disability holds or desires,"68
unions will surely insist on negotiating over what these "fundamental duties" entail.69 Since a determination of what job
functions are essential may have a direct impact on whether a
disabled employee has a job a t all," the ADA appears to make
collective bargaining on this issue a crucial requirement. Moreover, because the ADA lists reassignment as a potential reasonable accommodation for a qualified individual with a disability7'-an
accommodation which may adversely affect other

29 U.S.C. 8 158(d) (1988).
66.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 221 (1964) (Stewart,
67.
J., concurring).
29 C.F.R. 8 1630.2(n) (1992). The regulations also state that the term "es68.
sential functions" does not include the "marginal hnctions" of a position. Id.
69.
See Feller, supm note 64, at 738 (stating that collective bargaining
agreements may contain "provisions specifying the kind of work which different
classes of employees shall perform").
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. a t 222; see also Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447,
70.
453-54 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that a deaf employee established a prima facie case
of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act in part because the Postal Service's
Qualification Standards for Bargaining Unit Positions were overbroad and because
the applicable standard requiring that the time and attendance clerk be able "to
hear the conversational voice, hearing aid permitted" was not a "business necessity"); Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1425-26 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding that an
employee suffering from achondroplastic dwarfism was not qualified for a distribution clerk position because his short stature and limited reach rendered him unable
to do many of the tasks required in the position).
71.
42 U.S.C. 8 12112(9) (Supp. I1 1990).
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unionized e m p l ~ ~ e e s ~ ~ - tADA
h e appears to actively promote
collective bargaining, since reassignment policies have long
been recognized a s subjects of compulsory collective
bargaining. 73

B. The ADA and the NLRA Policy Favoring Arbitration
The potential conflicts between the ADA and the NLRA are
not limited t o questions of exclusive representation and collective bargaining. An apparent inconsistency also exists between
the ADA's provision allowing a disabled person to bring a private cause of action against an employer and the NLRA's policy
of promoting arbitration.
1. The Steelworkers Trilogy
Perhaps the most frequently cited cases involving federal
labor policy are known as the "Steelworkers Tril~gy.'"~The
Supreme Court's opinions in the three cases, decided on the
same day, elevated arbitration to a preeminent role in the
resolution of labor disputes. The Court first held that federal
courts should not consider the merits of an employee's claim as
long a s the employee has some claim that is susceptible t o the
grievance arbitration procedure.75 In other words, if any
doubts exist as to whether a particular employee grievance is
arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement, those
doubts "should be resolved in favor of ~overage."'~
Most importantly, the Court held that federal courts
should take a "hands off" approach to the decisions of labor
arbitrators; an arbitrator's decision should stand as long as "it
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."77
72.
See infra note 137.
Fibreboard, 379 U.S. a t 224.
73.
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
74.
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US.
593 (1960).
75.
American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568. The Court stated that the courts
have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is
particular language in the written instrument which will support the
.
claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances t o arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious.

Id.
76.
77.

Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. a t 583.
Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. a t 597. "The refusal of courts to review the
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Thus, the trilogy heartily endorsed collective bargaining's grievance arbitration process.
2. ADA endorsement of arbitration
The Americans with Disabilities Act arguably gives a ringing endorsement of its own to collective bargaining and established policies encouraging arbitration. The fact that the ADA
explicitly recognizes the significance of collective bargaining
agreements in the workplace indicates that the ADA implicitly
recognizes arbitration as the standard procedure that should be
used t o enforce the agreements. Indeed, the suggestion in a
Senate report that future collective bargaining agreements
"contain a provision permitting the employer t o take all actions
necessary" to comply with the ADA7' indicates a congressional
preference for unions and employers to incorporate the ADA's
provisions into bargaining agreements and t o interpret these
provisions by means of grievance arbitration.
Moreover, "where appropriate and to the extent authorized
by law" the ADA explicitly encourages the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution "including settlement negotiations,
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact finding, mini-trials,
and arbitration."" Such a stance is consistent with federal
labor policy stating that the grievance procedure is an integral
part of the continuing collective bargaining proce~s.'~
However, since the ADA is civil rights legislation, it could
fail to endorse arbitration and still not undermine established
principles of grievance resolution that have arisen under the
NLRA scheme.s1 When considering the roots of arbitration, it
merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards."
Id. at 596.
78.
Murphy, supra note 4, a t 1618 n.75 (citing S. REP. NO. 116, lOlst Cong.,
1st Sess. 32 (1989)).
79.
42 U.S.C. $ 12212 (Supp. I1 1990).
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. a t 578 ("Arbitration of labor disputes under col80.
lective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself.").
81.
Provisions governing grievance procedure, while not mandated by the
NLRA, now appear in collective bargaining agreements as a matter of course. One
study conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1961-62 examined all collective agreements covering 1000 or more workers in effect at the time, excepting
railroad, airline, and government agreements. Of these, only 20 agreements, covering some 50,000 workers, or slightly more than one-half of one percent, contained
no grievance procedure. Feller, supra note 64, a t 742 n.350.
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is important to remember that arbitration clauses (requiring
grievance arbitration) in collective bargaining agreements are
not the result of management's good will. While arbitration
clauses may provide labor and management with a mechanism
for resolving employee disputes, they typically are agreed upon
because labor and management make a deal, not out of pure
concern for employees. It is often stated that the arbitration
clause is the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause.82Therefore,
arbitration might be viewed as a means of reducing the costs to
employers through strike avoidance rather than a means of addressing the rights of individual employee^.^^
Furthermore, the mere inclusion of an "ADA complia n ~ e clause
" ~ ~ or other nondiscrimination clause in a collective
bargaining agreement will not foreclose a disabled employee
from bringing suit under the ADA as the following section
demonstrates.

3. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.

In a landmark labor case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
CO.,'~Alexander, a black employee, filed a grievance under
the collective bargaining agreement governing his workplace
after he was discharged by the company. In addition to a broad
arbitration clause, the agreement contained two important
provisions: one provided that the employer retained the right to
discharge employees for cause, and the other broadly prohibited
discrirninati~n.~~

82.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974) (citing Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970)).
Id. a t 54-55. The AZexader Court noted:
83.
The primary incentive for an employer to enter into an arbitration agreement is the union's reciprocal promise not to strike . . . . It is not unreasonable to assume that most employers will regard the benefits derived
from a no-strike pledge a s outweighing whatever costs may result fmm
according employees an arbitral remedy against discrimination in addition
to their judicial remedy under Title VII. Indeed, the severe consequences
of a strike may make an arbitration clause almost essential from both the
employees' and the employer's perspective.

Id.
84.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Id. a t 39. The anti-discrimination clause stated that "there shall be no
86.
discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry." Id.
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After the company rejected Alexander's claims that he was
discharged because of racial discrimination, the grievance was
submitted to arbitrati~n.'~However, before an arbitration
hearing took place, Alexander "filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which [subsequently] referred the complaint to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commi~sion."'~Soon thereafter, Alexander raised
his discrimination claim before a n arbitrator. However, the
arbitrator ruled adversely, finding that Alexander had been
"discharged for just cause."89 The EEOC also issued a n unfavorable ruling, finding that "there was not reasonable cause to
believe that a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 . . . had occurred."g0
Alexander then filed suit in federal court, claiming anew
that he had been the victim of a racially discriminatory employment practice in violation of section 703(a)(1) of the Civil
Rights Act.g1 Both the district court and the Tenth Circuit
held that since he had chosen to pursue his grievance to final
arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective
bargaining agreement, Alexander was bound by the arbitrator's
decision and was therefore barred from suing his employer
under Title VII.g"owever,
the Supreme Court reversed,
holdmg that "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor
disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting a n
employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievancearbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his
cause of action under Title VII."93
a. Civil rights suits address the collective needs of employees. The Court's reasoning sheds much light on the ADA and its
relationship with federal labor policy. First, the Court noted
that the private right of action available to a n employee under
Title VII is essential because a private person's suit "not only
redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment

Id.
Id.
Id.
employee's
Id.
90.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
87.
88.
89.

at 42.
In ruling against the employee, the arbitrator did not comment on the
claim of racial discrimination.
at 43.

at 59-60 (emphasis added).
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practice^."^ By providing for a private cause of action, both
Title VII and the ADA serve as mechanisms by which individual employees can improve the lot of their co-workers. Thus,
civil rights legislation, including such acts as Title VII and the
ADA, actually promotes the collective voice of employees in a
manner similar to the NLRA.
b. Contractual rights are different from statutory
rights. The Alexander Court also distinguished grievance
arbitration, which employees use to vindicate contractual rights
under a collective bargaining agreement, from a lawsuit filed
under Title VII, which employees use to assert independent
statutory rights." Reasoning that contractual and statutory
rights remain separate even though an employee alleges that
both were violated as the result of one factual occurrence, the
Court stated that "no inconsistency results from permitting
both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate
forums.'""n
fact, "the relationship between the forums is
complementary since consideration of the claim by both forums
may promote the policies underlying each."97
The same reasoning is applicable to the ADA.g8 The
ADA's statement of findings makes it evident that Congress
passed the Act because existing laws did not adequately protect
the rights of disabled Americans." While the ADA targets discrimination against the disabled in all sectors of the community, not just in the unionized workplace, it is arguable that part

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 45 (citations omitted).
at 49-50.
at 50.
at 50-51.
I t has been noted that the ADA contains the same broad coverage of Title
VII and refers to Title VII in its enforcement provisions. Renee L. Cyr, Note, T h
Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK.L. REV. 1237, 1258 (1992); see also
Smith, supra note 38, at 12 (pointing out that the ADA, like $ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, adopts all of the remedies available under Title VII). The relevant
provision of the ADA states:
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4,
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers,
remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the Commission, to
the Attorney General, or to any person alleging discrimination on the
basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning employment.
42 U.S.C. $ 12117(a) (Supp. I1 1990).
99.
42 U.S.C. 5 12101(a) (Supp. II 1990).
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of the reason Congress found it necessary "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with di~abilities"'~~
was that the
grievances of disabled employees were not being properly addressed through arbitration pro~edures.'~'
c. Civil rights statutes do not preempt federal labor
law. While it was intended to provide additional remedies for
the disabled, the ADA does not preempt the NLRA.'" The
ADA, like Title VII, was not designed to prohibit arbitration as
a n effective avenue of redress for employees who suffer discrimination.lo3 Both the NLRA policy favoring arbitration and the
100. Id. $ 12101@)(2). The Act's findings also indicate congressional recognition
that the collective voice of disabled Americans was not being heard:
[Ilndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to, society.
Id. § 12101(a)(7). If unions as the collective voice for labor had been advocating
appropriately for disabled employees, the "political powerlessnessn of the disabled
might have been mitigated.
101.
See Fried, supra note 46, a t 1028 (noting that by enacting FLSA, OSHA,
ERISA, and Title VII, "[wle have indeed moved toward a system that recognizes
individual workers' rights independent of labor-union bargaining").
102. As one author commented, the argument that the ADA preempts the NLRA
focuses on 4 501 of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. $ 12201(a)-(b) (Supp. I1 1990), which
preempts federal laws that provide lesser protection to disabled individuals than
the ADA. Smith, supra note 38, at 45. Smith relies on language in a House Report
on the ADA to support his conclusion that the preemption argument fails. "This
section (501) explains the relationship between section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and this Act and the relationship between this Act and State laws that
provide greater protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities . . . ." H.R.
REP. NO. 485(I), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
288-89. Because the NLRA does not provide any specific protection to the disabled
as a class, it was not one of the acts Congress intended the ADA to preempt as
providing lesser protections than the ADA. Smith, supra note 38, at 45-46.
103.
Employers concerned about the possibility of "dual remediesn should be
directed to the opinion in AZexander, where the Court addressed the issue in the
context of a Title VII dispute. Concluding that an employee is entitled to pursue
both a Title VII suit and arbitration, the Court reasoned:
Nor can it be maintained that election of remedies is required by the
possibility of unjust enrichment through duplicative recoveries. Where, as
here, the employer has prevailed at arbitration, there, of course, can be
no duplicative recovery. But even in cases where the employee has first
prevailed, judicial relief can be structured to avoid such windfall gains.
Furthermore, if the relief obtained by the employee a t arbitration were
fully equivalent to that obtainable under Title VII, there would be no
further relief for the court to grant and hence no need for the employee
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ADA's provisions for civil suit are fundamental components of
a n overall strategy aimed a t eliminating discrimination against
the disabled.
d. Limitations on arbitrators necessitate private causes of
action under the ADA. Finally, while the Alexander Court recognized that arbitration may be a n appropriate and effective
avenue for resolving discrimination claims,'" it also noted
that arbitration is in many respects inferior to federal courts as
a forum for adjudicating Title VII rights.'05 Arbitration may
be a n inappropriate forum because the arbitrator's primary role
is to enforce the contractual rights of the parties, not to enforce
the requirements of civil rights legislation.lo6 In addition, arbitrators are typically conversant with the 'law of the shop, not
the law of the land,"lo7 while federal courts are designated to
resolve constitutional and statutory issues.'08
This same reasoning explains why disabled employees
covered by a collective bargaining agreement must be able to
bring civil suits under the ADA. Under the best scenario, unions and management will incorporate the ADA's nondiscrimination provisions into collective bargaining agreements and use
the grievance arbitration process to provide appropriate redress
for complaints arising under the agreements. However, since
the possibility remains that disabled employees will occasionally be denied appropriate relief in arbitration,'" they must be
to institute suit.
Alexundw, 415 U.S. at 51 11.14 (citations omitted).
104.
The Court reasoned:
[Tlhe grievance-arbitration machinery of the collective-bargaining agreement remains a relatively inexpensive and expeditious means for resolving
a wide range of disputes, including claims of discriminatory employment
practices. Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to Title VII, and where arbitral procedures are
fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a settlement satisfactory to
both employer and employee.
Id. at 55.
105. Id. at 56.
106. Id. at 56-57.
107. Id. at 57 (citing United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)).
108. Id.
109. Discussing the potential inadequacies of the arbitration process in resolving
Title VII claims, the AL~xanderCourt stated:
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the manner and
extent to which an individual grievance is presented. In arbitration, as in
the collective-bargaining process, the interests of the individual employee
may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the
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allowed to seek judxial remedies.

IV. THE ADA AND THE RAILWAY LABORACT
Another act embodying important federal labor policy is
the Railway Labor Act (RLA).l10 The RLA, enacted to address
the rights of individuals employed by carriers, is similar to the
NLRA in that it gives employees the right to organize and
bargain collectively; in addition, the RLA establishes procedures for grievance arbitration. l1 However, the arbitration
procedure under the RLA raises some perplexing preemption
issues when it is examined together with the ADA. This section
explores potential conflicts between the ADA and the RLA and
suggests that the RLA, like the NLRA, can coexist harmoniously with the ADA.
A. Grievance Arbitration Under the RLA
The primary purpose of the RLA is to provide a n orderly,
peaceful method by which labor and management can resolve
labor dispute^."^ This process requires "minor disputes" to be
initially submitted to grievance procedures that are contractually agreed upon by the parties.ll3 Courts have interpreted
"minor dispute" to mean any dispute between employees and
carriers arising out of "the interpretation or application of [a]
collective bargaining agreement."I l4
bargaining unit. Moreover, harmony of interest between the union and the
individual employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim
of racial discrimination is made. And a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation may prove difficult to establish.
Id. at 58 n.19 (citations omitted).
110. 45 U.S.C. $$ 151-188 (1988).
111. Id. $3 152-153.
112. Part of the RLA's purpose is to
provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; [and] . . . to provide for the
prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances
or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of
pay, rules, or working conditions.
Id. $ 151(a)(4)-(5).
113. Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1096 n.4 (9th Cir. 1991)
("Disputes 'growing out of grievances, or out of interpretation or application of
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions' must be resolved
through grievance procedures provided for in collective-bargaining agreement[s]."
(quoting 45 U.S.C. $ 184 (1988))).
114. , Id.; see also Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 792 F.2d 576, 580 (6th Cir.
1986) (quoting Kaschak v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 707 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir.
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If a minor dispute remains unresolved following grievance
procedures, the RLA requires the parties to submit to binding
arbitration before the National Railway Adjustment Board
(NRAB)' l5 or a privately established arbitration panel. l6
Courts have been strict in requiring adherence to this process.
Failure to submit to grievance procedures or the NRAB results
i n the dismissal of a n employee's or carrier's suit brought directly in federal court.ll7 Thus, the RLA arguably encourages
arbitration even more vigorously does than the NLRA. The
potential conflict this RLA policy poses with the ADA (and
other civil rights statutes) is significant; nevertheless, the potential conflict is capable of resolution because the Supreme
Court has clearly marked the path.
B. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Buell
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of RLA preemption in the landmark case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway u. Buell.l18 In Buell, Buell filed a complaint in federal court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),
which enables railroad workers to sue their employers for personal injuries received from employers or c o - w ~ r k e r s .The
~~~
complaint alleged that as a direct and proximate result of the
railroad's failure to protect Buell from malicious and oppressive
harassment from his fellow employees, Buell suffered an emotional breakdown. lZ0
Not surprisingly, the railroad asserted that Buell's sole
remedy was binding arbitration before the National Railroad
Adjustment Board as required by the RLA.121 The Court rejected this argument, holding that regardless of the strong RLA
policy favoring arbitration, Buell was not barred from bringing
a n FELA action for damages? The Buell Court's reasoning
1983)), amended, 811 F.2d 286 (1987).
The Adjustment Board consists of 34 members, 17 selected by carriers and
115.
17 selected by recognized labor organizations of employees. 45 U.S.C. $ 153 First
(1988).
116.
Stephens, 792 F.2d a t 580 (citation omitted); see also Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 491 U.S. 299 (1989) (holding that an
adjustment board created under the R I A has exclusive jurisdiction over minor
disputes).
Stephens, 792 F.2d a t 580 n.6.
117.
118. 480 US. 557 (1987).
119.
Id. at 559.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 564. The Court reasoned:
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is relevant in two aspects to the relationship between the ADA
and the RLA.

I . The ADA created federal statutory rights for individuals
Most important is the Court's statement that the federal
labor policy promoting arbitration cannot preempt a n
employee's private cause of action brought under a federal statute enacted to create substantive rights for i n d i ~ i d u a l s . ' ~ ~
This reasoning tends to support the argument that the RLA
and other federal labor acts do not preempt the ADA. Clearly,
the ADA is a federal statute designed to "provide minimum
substantive guarantees to individual worker^."'^^
Yet this reasoning can also be problematic, for preemption
arguably does not depend on whether the employee's suit is
brought under a federal or state statute,'" but on whether the
The f a d that an injury otherwise compensable under the FELA was
caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the
RLA does' not deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring an FELA
action for damages. Presumably a host of personal injuries suffered by
railroad employees are caused by negligent practices and conditions that
might have been cured or avoided by the timely invocation of the grievance machinery. But we have never considered that possibility a bar to
an employee's bringing an FELA claim for personal injuries, and the
Railroad has not persuaded u s to do so now.
Id. (citation omitted).
123.
The opinion's key language reads:
This Court has, on numerous occasions, declined to hold that individual employees are, because of the availability of arbitration, barred from
bringing claims under federal statutes. See, e.g., McDonald v. West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U S . 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974). Although the analysis of the question under each statute is quite
distinct, the theory running through these cases is that notwithstanding
the strong policies encouraging arbitration, "different considerations apply
where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers." Barrentine, supra, at 737.
Buell, 480 U.S. a t 564-65.
124.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981).
125.
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit has held that the RLA preempts state civil
rights acts, thus barring an employee from bypassing RLA arbitration procedures
and bringing suit directly against the employer. In McCall v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 844 F.2d 294 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879 (1988), the court held that
the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act was preempted by the RLA. Distinguishing Buell, the court stated:
Although Bud1 stands for the proposition that claims under substantive statutory rights may be decided outside of the labor arbitration machinery, it should not be read . . . to dictate a holding in this case that
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the dispute can be resolved independently of the collective
bargaining agreement. Several courts have held that state civil
rights statutes barring employment discrimination are preempted by the RLA, reasoning that when a n RLA arbitration
board "is required by the collective bargaining agreement to
make the same factual inquiry regarding physical ability to
perform a job as would be made under the state act, the federal
dispute resolution process is the sole remedy."126
Because the ADA is a federal law, federal case law like
Buell will likely control interpretation of the ADA. Yet these
state cases still portend cloudy horizons for the ADA. Since the
ADA's regulations stipulate that the terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be considered in determining whether
a n employer is required to make a particular accommodation,'" employers conceivably will often insist that the agreement is determinative and therefore that arbitration is the
exclusive forum for resolving claims arising under the ADA. In
other words, employers may attempt to avoid suit under the
ADA by arguing that a determination of the validity of a n
employee's claims requires analysis of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement.lZ8 If courts accept these arguments,
the entire purpose of the ADA will be undermined.
Nevertheless, courts will hopefully be persuaded by the
reasoning in Buell and similar cases arising under the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA)lZgand recognize that the
the state act is preempted. FELA, the statute involved in Buell, is a
federal statute . . . . In the instant case, we are concerned with a state
statute. The issue is not the relationship between two federal statutes
passed by Congress; it is the relationship between a federal statute and a
state statute.
Id. at 298.
126. Id. a t 303. See also Stephens v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 792 F.2d 576, 580 (6th
Cir. 1986) ("If the [state] 'action is based on a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with the grievance machinery of the collective bargaining agreement and of the R.L.A.,' exclusive jurisdiction of the NRAB preempts the action."
(citation omitted)); Underwood v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 78, 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Although the existence of a relationship between rights regulated
by the state and the collective bargaining agreement is not in itself enough to
mandate preemption, the strong similarity between the inquiry that an Adjustment
Board would have to make and that made by a jury in a state cause of action
requires that the claim under the [New York Human Rights Law] be preempted in
this case.").
127. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 126.
129. While cases arising under the LMRA do not control cases arising under the
RLA because RLA preemption is broader, Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGFEEMENTS
ADA creates independent rights that deserve protection in
federal court. By recognizing that collective bargaining agreements may be relevant when one interprets its various provisions, the ADA validates the policies of collective bargaining
F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1991), cases arising under the LMRA are helpful in
determining when statutory rights are independent enough to arise separately from
collective bargaining agreements.
The most important case discussing preemption in the context of the LMRA is
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). In Lingle, an employee was discharged for allegedly filing a false worker's compensation claim.
Although the employee pursued arbitration and was eventually reinstated with full
backpay, he also brought a state law tort claim in federal court, alleging that he
had been discharged in retaliation for exercising his rights under the state
worker's compensation laws.
In holding that the employee's state law claim for retaliatory discharge was not
preempted by $ 301 of the LMRA (because the claim did not require interpretation
of a collective bargaining agreement), the Court reasoned:
[Elven if' dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement,
on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for $ 301 pre-emption purposes.
Id. a t 409-10. The Court also relied on its prior reasoning in Buell, stating that
"there is nothing novel about recognizing that substantive rights in the labor relations context can exist without interpreting collective-bargaining agreements." Id. a t
411.
Following Lingle, at least two courts have held that an employee's state law
claim of handicap discrimination is not preempted by the LMRA. See Smolarek v.
Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326 (6th Cir.) (holding that an employee's claim was not
preempted by LMRA $ 301 because resolution of a handicap discrimination claim
would not require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 992 (1989); Ackerman v. Western Elec, Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that an employee's discrimination claim under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act was not preempted by LMRA $ 301 because the
right is "defmed and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of
any collective bargaining agreement").
See also Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that an Oregon statute prohibiting discrimination based on physical handicap
created a "mandatory and independent state right that is not preempted by section
301"); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1987)
(holding that employee's claim of handicap discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act was not preempted by the LMRA), afd, 863 F.2d 881
(5th Cir. 1988); Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D.
Mass. 1986) (holding that employee's claim of handicap discrimination and wrongful
discharge was not preempted by LMRA 4 301 because the duty not to discharge
employees on the basis of handicap arose from state common law, "independent of
any right established by contract").
Cf. Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employee's claim that her employer violated RICO by paying her disability benefits in an amount less than that provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was preempted by the RLA, employee based her RICO claim "on
predicate acts that involve[d] violation of a right created by the CBA").
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and arbitration under the RLA just as it does under the NLRA.
Yet binding arbitration cannot be an exclusive forum for the
disabled under the RLA any more than it is under the NLRA.
2. The ADA provides disabled employees with individualized
remedies
The other significant point made by the Buell Court is that
some federal statutes, like FELA, not only provide workers
with "substantive protection against negligent conduct that is
independent of the employer's obligations under its collectivebargaining agreement, but also afford[] injured workers a remedy suited to their needs, unlike the limited relief that seems to
be available through the Adjustment Board."lso Certainly
Title I of the ADA accomplishes the same goal; its entire thrust
is to eliminate employment discrimination against the disabled
by requiring employers to make reasonable accomodations
suited t o the individual needs of each disabled empl~yee.'~'
Thus, when called upon to adjudicate conflicts arising between
the RLA and the ADA, courts should hold that arbitration
cannot be the last stop for disabled employees.
V. REASSIGNMENT
AND REASONABLE
ACCOMMODATION
Perhaps the best way to understand how the federal labor
policies discussed will impact the ADA is to examine the issue
of rea~signrnent,'~~
a n issue of substantial concern among
employers facing compliance with the Act.lS3 This issue is of
critical importance to employers with a unionized workforce because reassignment policies, which are often tied to senioriare usually an integral part of the collective bargaining
130. Buell, 480 U.S. a t 565 (emphasis added).
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
131.
132.
The term "reassignment" is generally understood to mean "any transfer of
an employee from one position to another position, including demotions." Kathryn
W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does Reasonable Accommodation or AfFrmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 TEX. L.
REV.781, 820 11.209 (1989).
133.
See, eg., Michael J. Lotito & Michael J. Soltis, Prepare for ADA Now,
INDUS.
WEEK, Oct. 7, 1991, at 64; Michael A. Verespej, Here. Comes a New Legal
WEEK, Nov. 4, 1991, a t 85.
Quagmire, INDUS.
134. Set?, eg., Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789 (1st Cir. 1989) (reassignment of
disabled Postal Service employee was not required when such action would violate
the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement requiring that assignments must be bid for and then awarded on the basis of seniority); Carter v.
Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) (disabled employee denied reassignment
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agreement. Unfortunately, this issue is clouded with confusion
because of the ADA's failure to address it squarely.'" This
section examines how the ADA's provision for reassignment, as
a possible reasonable accommodation, interacts with federal
labor policies that favor collective bargaining and arbitration.

A. Reassignment under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
2

Several courts have found that reassignment is not a reasonable accommodation required by the Rehabilitation Act
because a n employee may be fired if she can no longer perform
the essential functions of the job for which she was hired.ls6
More importantly, the majority of courts that have considered
the issue in a union setting have found that reassignment
cannot be a required accommodation if it "usurp[s] the legitimate rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement."13'
This precedent has the potential to exert strong influence
over interpretation of the ADA; even though the ADA specifically includes reassignment a s a possible accommodation,'"
Title I of the ADA is modeled after the regulations that implement section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.lSg Therefore, if
-

because collective bargaining agreement required that an employee serve five years
before beconiing eligible for a permanent light duty assignment).
135.
One author commented that while the EEOC provides that "employers may
refer to a collective-bargaining agreement to clarify whether a particular job function is essential[,] . . . it left unanswered whether filling job vacancies according to
collective-bargaining rules violates ADA provisions if those rules would discriminate
against someone with a disability." Verespej, supra note 133, a t 85.
136. See, e g . , Black v. Frank, 730 F. Supp. 1087, 1091 (S.D. Ala. 1990);
Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481, 486 (W.D. Tern. 1986), afd, 831 F.2d 298
(6th Cir. 1987); Alderson v. Postmaster Gen., 598 F. Supp. 49, 55 (W.D. Okla.
1984).
137.
Florence v. Frank, 774 F. Supp. 1054, 1062 (N.D. Tex. 1991); see also Shea
v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 467 (4th
Cir. 1987); Daubert v. United States Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1370 (10th Cir.
1984); Davis v. United States Postal Sew., 675 F. Supp. 225, 235 (M.D. Pa. 1987);
Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1424 (D. Corn. 1987); Hurst v. United States
Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259, 261 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp.
1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985); Jasany v. United States Postal Sew., 33 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1115 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 755 F.2d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir.
1985); Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
138.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. 11 1990).
139.
29 C.F.R. app. $ 1630 (1992). The overview of the regulations states:
The format of part 1630 reflects congressional intent, as expressed in
the legislative history, that the regulations implementing the employment
provisions of the ADA be modeled on the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a s amended, 34 CFR part 104.
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courts interpret the ADA's requirement of reasonable accommodation against a backdrop of Rehabilitation Act litigation, they
might continue to bar reassignment when the terms of a collective bargaining agreement prohibit such action. Indeed, when
one considers the Supreme Court's opinion in Ford Motor Co. u.
EEOC,l4' the validity of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation seems marginal a t best.

B. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC
I n this case, Judy Gaddis applied for a job in 1971 as a
"picker-packer" at the Ford warehouse in Charlotte, North
Carolina. At the time she applied, no woman had ever worked
a s a "picker-packer" in the warehouse.'" Even though she
was qualified for the position, Ford hired a man, prompting
Gaddis to file a charge of sexual discrimination with the
EEOC.142
In July 1973, another position opened and Ford offered the
job to Gaddis, but without seniority retroactive to her 1971
app1i~ation.l~~
Gaddis rejected this offer, partly because she
did not want to lose the seniority she had accrued working a t
General Motors in the interim.'" In July 1975, the EEOC
sued Ford in federal district court, "alleging that Ford had
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by refusing to
hire women at the Charlotte w a r e h ~ u s e . " ' ~ ~
The district court held, and the court of appeals affirmed,
that Ford had discriminated against Gaddis on the basis of her
sex and that Gaddis was therefore entitled to backpay dating
from July 1973, when she rejected Ford's unconchtional job
offer.'46 However, the court of appeals suggested that "had
Ford promised retroactive seniority with its job offer, the offer
would have cut off Ford's backpay liability."'47 Without such

Accordingly, in developing part 1630, the Commission has been guided by
the section 504 regulations and the case law interpreting those regulations.

Id.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

458 US. 219 (1982).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 223 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 223-24.
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an offer, Ford's 1973 offer was "incomplete and unacceptable."148
Overturning the decision of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that "absent special circumstances, the rejection of a n employer's unconditional job offer ends the accrual of
potential backpay liability."149In reaching this conclusion, the
Court reasoned that Title VII permits courts to consider the
rights of "innocent third parties."'" The Court then stated:
The lower court's rule places a particularly onerous burden on
the innocent employees of an employer charged with discrimination. Under the court's rule, an employer may cap backpay
liability only by forcing his incumbent employees to yield
seniority to a person who has not proved, and may never
prove, unlawful discrimination. As we have acknowledged on
numerous occasions, seniority plays a central role in allocating benefits and burdens among employees. In light of the
" 'overriding importance' " of these rights, American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S.63, 76 (1982) (quoting Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 346 (1964)), we should be wary of any
rule that encourages job offers that compel innocent workers
to sacrifice their seniority to a person who has only claimed,
but not yet proved, unlawful di~crimination.'~'

Thus, the Court was unwilling to give Title VII rights superpriority over the contractual rights of seniority to which employees were entitled under a collective bargaining agreement. 152
-

148. Id. at 224.
149. Id. at 241.
150. Id. at 239 (citing City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 US. 702, 723 (1978)).
151. Id. at 239-40. In a footnote, the Court commented:
Seniority may govern, " 'not only promotion and layoff, but also transfer,
demotion, rest days, shift assignments, prerogative in scheduling vacation,
order of layoff, possibilities of lateral transfer to avoid layoff, 'bumping'
possibilities in the face of layoff, order of recall, training opportunities,
working conditions, length of layoff endured without reducing seniority,
length of layoff recall rights will withstand, overtime opportunities, parking privileges, and [even] a preferred place in the punch-out line.' "
at
239 n.28 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 US. 747, 766-67
Id.
(1976)) (emphasis added).
152. Emphasizing that costs to an employer would be high were retroactive seniority to be granted, the Court stated:
The rule adopted by the court below . . . makes hiring the Title VII
claimant more costly than hiring one of the other applicants for the same
job. To give the claimant retroactive seniority before an adjudication of
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Because reassignment policies usually are tied to seniority,lS and because seniority provisions are "universally
included"'" in collective bargaining agreements, Ford casts
substantial doubt on the legality of requiring reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA when reassignment
impacts seniority. Nevertheless, reassignment should be, and
is, a legitimate form of reasonable accommodation for disabled
employees.

1. A few courts permit reassignment
First, some courts have held that the Rehabilitation Act
requires an employer to consider reassignment when a disabled
employee becomes unable to perform the essential functions of
the job for which he was hired.ls5 While the employees in
liability, the employer must be willing to pay the additional costs of the
fringe benefits that come with the seniority that newly hired workers
usually do not receive. More important, the employer must also be prepared to cope with the deterioration in morale, labor unrest, and reduced
productivity that may be engendered by inserting the claimant into the
seniority ladder over the heads of the incumbents who have earned their
places through their work on the job. In many cases, moreover, disruption
of the existing seniority system will violate a collective-bargaining agreement, with all that such a violation entails for the employer's labor relations. Under the rule adopted by the court below, the employer must be
willing to accept all these additional costs if he hopes to toll his backpay
liability by offering the job to the claimant. As a result, the employer will
be less, rather than more, likely to hire the claimant.
Id. at 229.
See supra note 134.
153.
154.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977); see also
Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. NLRB, 825 F.2d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
that the question of how to order seniority in a new bargaining unit created by
the consolidation of two preexisting units was a matter for the bargaining table);
Schick v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 1969) (stating that seniority is "valid
subject matter for the collective bargaining process"); Oneita Knitting Mills, Inc. v.
NLRB, 375 F.2d 385, 388 (4th Cir. 1967) (stating that because seniority has a vital
impact on "terms and conditions of employment" it is a mandatory subject of bargaining); NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 979-80 (8th Cir. 1967)
("Seniority rights and layoff practices have been recognized by the courts as falling
within the broad definition of 'terms and conditions of employment.' " (citation
omitted)).
155.
Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the
offer of a staff nurse position to a disabled former head nurse was a permissible
reasonable accommodation); Coley v. Secretary of Army, 689 F. Supp. 519 (D. Md.
1987) (holding that the Army had a duty to attempt reassignment of handicapped
persons prior to termination, which entailed consideration of the variety of positions for which the employee was allegedly qualified); Rhone v. United States Dep't
of Army, 665 F. Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Mo. 1987) ("While agencies cannot be expected to search ad infiniturn for a position that will correlate with a handicapped
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these cases were not covered by collective bargaining agreements, that fact should not bar courts from requiring reassignment under the ADA; several of the cases rejecting reassignment in the collective bargaining context have done so because
the Rehabilitation Act did not explicitly require reassignment.'" Therefore, the door is open for future courts to interpret the ADA as requiring more than the Rehabilitation Act. .
2. Seniority and reassignment policies are mandatory subjects

of bargaining
Second, seniority provisions and reassignment policies are
considered mandatory subjects of bargaining because they
affect the "terms and conditions of empl~yment."'~~
Therefore,
these provisions and policies will probably be modified in collective bargaining negotiations to reflect ADA policies. It should
be noted that the ADA explicitly prohibits a covered entity from
using collective bargaining agreements a s an excuse to discriminate.

3. Reassignment is not mandatory
Third, reassignment is not mandatory under the ADA; it is
only one of several alternatives to be considered by an employer in determining the appropriate accommodation for a disabled employee. Not only did Congress place limitations on the
scope of r e a s ~ i g n m e n t , ' ~
but
~ i t also recognized that reas-

employee's remaining abilities and qualifications, . . . federal employers are bound
to undertake a reasonable and competent. attempt to retain such employees in a
capacity in which they are qualified and capable of serving.").
156. Tate, supra note 132, at 833.
157. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
158. According to the Act, the term "discriminate" includes
participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that
has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an
employee of a covered entity, or an organization providing training and
apprenticeship programs).
42 U.S.C. $ 12112(b)(2) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
159. The House Education and Labor Report on the ADA stated:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a vacant
position. If an employee, because of disability, can no longer perform the
essential hnctions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the employee
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signment should be considered only as a last resort.160 As one
author has noted, "when it would be possible to accommodate
a n employee by job restructuring or modifying the employee's
work schedule, such avenues must be pursued before reassigning the employee to another p~sition."'~~
4. The ADA recognizes federal labor policy

Finally, the ADA's recognition of collective bargaining
agreements as a factor to consider in determining what accommodations the ADA requires implies that substantial limits
must be placed on reassignment. While employers cannot simply ignore the ADA and claim that they are absolutely barred
from considering reassignment under the collective bargaining
agreement, individuals suing under the ADA cannot hold to the
other extreme and claim that reassignment is always mandatory where available. Nevertheless, reassignment should at least
be considered. Both federal labor laws and the ADA have important roles to play in assuring that reassignment becomes a
fair and reasonable option among accommodations that may be
offered to disabled employees.

VI. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act marks
the dawning of a new era of civil rights. No longer forced to
suffer in silence the harsh discrimination to which they have
been subjected for decades, disabled Americans are now assured a permanent and important place in society, particularly
in the workforce.
Yet exuberance over the ADA's passage should not be blind
to the circumstances under which it will operate. Primarily a
law to end a specific facet of employment discrimination, the
ADA will necessarily interact with several other laws governing
employment relationships in the United States. Specifically,
the ADA will become an integral piece of established federal

from being out of work and employer from losing a valuable worker . . . .
The Committee . . . wishes to make clear the reassignment need only be
to a vacant position-"bumping" another employee out of a position to
create a vacancy is not required.
H.R. REP. NO. 485(n[), lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1990), reprinted i n , 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 345.
160.
Cyr, supra note 98, at 1255.
161. Id. (citation omitted).
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labor policy promoting collective bargaining and arbitration.
Consequently, courts must interpret the ADA so as to not trample the legitimate rights of employees and employers working
under valid collective bargaining agreements. Labor has come
too far to be casually brushed aside in the interest of providing
"reasonable accomodations"; the ADA might never have succeeded if labor had not laid the groundwork for learning how to
restrain management from arbitrary decisions.lB2
At the same time, courts should recognize that the ADA is
a law intended to grant disabled persons the maximum protection possible. While it does not override federal labor policy, at
the same time it should not take a back seat. Discrimination
against the disabled is a problem in the union setting just as it
is elsewhere.
This comment suggests that the ADA and federal labor
laws are in reality two sides of the same coin. Both are designed to promote the collective voice of employees; both provide mechanisms whereby individual employees can petition for
redress. Finally, both have the capacity to be forceful tools in
the fight to end discrimination against the disabled. As the
ADA, the NLRA, and the RLA interact and work together to
create a better employment atmosphere for the disabled, all
Americans with disabilities can look to the future with hope
and anticipation.

David S. Doty

As John L. Lewis, founder of the Committee for Industrial Organization
(CIO) said in a famous speech:
No tin hat brigade of goose-stepping vigilantes or bibble-babbling mob
of blackguarding and corporation-paid scoundrels will prevent the onward
march of labor, or divert its purpose to play its natural and rational part
in the development of the economic, political, and social life of our nation.
Unionization, as opposed to communism, presupposes the relation of
employment; it is based upon the wage system, and i t recognizes fully
and unreservedly the institution of private property and the right to investment profits. It is upon the hller development of collective bargaining, the wider expansion of the labor movement, the increased influence
of labor in our national councils, that the perpetuity of our democratic
institutions must largely depend.
Labor's John L. Lewis Defends His Union's Right to Strike, in LEND ME YOUR
EARS:GREATSPEECHESIN HISTORY,supra note 1, at 585.
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